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the law he violated. The Court emphasized that ignorance of the law is
no excuse.
In interpreting the CWA, the district court looked to the statute
itself, reviewed relevant precedents, and examined the CWA's
legislative history. The court found the text of the CWA did not
indicate that Congress intended for the crime of "knowingly violates"
to create a specific intent standard nor an exception to the rule that
ignorance of the law is no defense. Thus, the court held the CWA did
not create a specific intent crime since the statute sets forth the correct
scienter requirement of "knowingly." The court further held the
indictment was sufficient because the statutory language at issue
implicitly applied the mens rea to all elements. As a result, the
indictment need not refer explicitly to each element and explain what
Metalite knew or what they must have known to be found guilty.
Metalite also argued the CWA is impermissibly vague, especially in
its use of the terms "point source" and "navigable waters of the United
States." The court considered this claim seriously since the CWA
involves criminal rather than civil penalties. The court cited the
accepted rule that in order for a penal statute to be constitutional, a
person of ordinary intelligence must be able to read from the statute
what conduct is proscribed so that he may avoid breaking the law.
After reviewing the words of the provision and their coinciding
definitions, the court agreed with the Government that the CWA was
easily understood and clearly established that one may not discharge
pollutants into the waters of the United States without a permit. Thus,
the court held that the CWA is constitutional because it gives ordinary
people fair warning of what conduct is prohibited and its detailed
definitions minimize arbitrary enforcement.
Finally, Metalite argued the indictment was unconstitutionally
delayed because the Government began investigating their alleged
environmental crimes in 1992 and issued a warrant in 1994, but did
not seek an indictment until 1999. The court stated in order for an
indictment to be dismissed for violating Fifth Amendment due
process, the defendant must show he was substantially prejudiced by
the delay and this prejudice outweighed the Government's reasons for
the delay. The court found Metalite could not demonstrate any actual
prejudice caused by the delay in the indictment and thus, denied
Metalite's motion to dismiss the indictment.
Vanessa L. Condra
Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. Conner, No. 98-3625, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10496 (E.D. La. July 20, 2000) (holding the Army Corps of
Engineers ("Corps") did not act arbitrarily and capriciously when it
issued a permit to build on wetlands because the Corps considered the
relevant factors and cumulative impacts before issuing the permit).

Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

Save Our Wetlands, Inc. ("SOWL") brought an action claiming the
Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") abused its discretion and was
arbitrary and capricious when it issued a permit to intervenor,
Tammany Holding Corp. ("THC"). The permit allowed THC to fill
119 acres of wetlands and build a residential subdivision. SOWL
argued the issuance of the permit was arbitrary and capricious because
the Corps' Environmental Assessment ("EA") and resulting Finding of
No Significant Impact ("FONSI") failed to consider the cumulative
impacts of the proposed project by ignoring past, proposed, and
reasonably foreseeable projects that would impact this geographical
area. SOWL sought to have the permit suspended or to have the court
order the Corps to either issue an Environmental Impact Statement
("EIS") or re-evaluate its EA and consider cumulative impacts. Both
parties filed cross motions for summary judgment in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.
The court looked to the National Environmental Policy Act and
the Council on Environmental Quality regulations to determine
whether the Corps acted arbitrarily and capriciously. According to the
regulations, the Corps had discretion not to issue an EIS and instead
issue a FONSI if the EA indicated that the project would not
significantly impact the environment. A court was required to review
the Corps' decisions under the deferential arbitrary and capricious
standard. Under this standard, the court was required to ensure that
the agency based its judgment on a consideration of the relevant
factors. The court could not substitute its own judgment for that of
the agency.
The court determined that the Corps had to consider the following
relevant factors: "(1) the area in which the proposed project would be
felt; (2) the impacts that are expected in that area from the proposed
project; (3) other actions-past, present, and reasonably foreseeablethat have had or are expected to have impacts in the same area; (4)
the impacts or expected impacts from these other actions; and (5) the
overall impact that can be expected if the individual impacts are
allowed to accumulate." The court examined the Corps' treatment of
these factors and concluded the Corps was not arbitrary and capricious
for three reasons.
First, forced pumpage and diking seriously diminished the wetland
and caused isolation. This separation created an area with its own
ecosystem that was used as pastureland at the time the permits were
issued. Furthermore, the Corps determined that opening this area to
the adjacent lake created only a shallow open water system rather than
a wetland or that extensive water level management would be required
to create a viable wetland area.
Second, the Federal Highway Administration issued an EIS when it
expanded 1-10 in 1987 and the Corps tiered into this EIS. The 1-10 EIS
said the area in question would become developed. The Corps noted
this conclusion in their EA, saying THC's development would have

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 4

access to the 1-10 interchange, which was specifically built for the
development site. The Corps' EA also said the development's
infrastructure and the interstate exchange would be able to handle
this increased traffic.
Third, the Corps conditioned THC's permit with mitigation. The
mitigation required THC to construct a 228-acre marsh open to the
lake. The court found the Corps' mitigation requirement reflected
consideration of cumulative impacts. However, mitigation alone was
not dispositive of sufficient analysis.
In addition, the administrative record contained extensive
comments by state and local agencies and private and public interests
groups. The Corps reflected on the comments and the court
concluded this demonstrated the Corps' analysis of relevant issues.
The court stated SOWL raised many legitimate concerns about the
However, the court
Corps' assessment of cumulative impacts.
concluded that despite SOWL's legitimate, good faith concerns about
the Corps' comprehensive assessment of cumulative impacts, these
concerns did not create a genuine issue of material fact concerning
the propriety of the Corps' issuance of the permit. The court granted
the Corps' and THC's motion for summary judgment, denied SOWL's
motion for summary judgment, and dismissed SOWL's claims against
Corps' and THC without prejudice.
Kirstin E. McMillan
Mayor of Baltimore v. Susquehanna River Basin Comm'n, No. WMN98-3135, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8199 (D. Md. Mar. 30, 2000) (holding
the Susquehanna River Basin Commission was within its authority to
issue a "Determination Regarding Withdrawals and Diversions by the
City of Baltimore" ("the Determination") and denying the City of
Baltimore's request for summary judgment that the Determination was
null and void).
The City of Baltimore ("City") entered into an agreement in 1960
with the power company building the Conowingo Dam on the
Susquehanna River to withdraw water from the Conowingo Pool. The
agreement permitted the City to withdraw up to 250 million gallons
per day ("mgd") free of charge, with a more limited withdrawal during
low flow periods. In 1970, Maryland, New York, and Pennsylvania, the
three states within the Susquehanna River Basin ("Basin"), entered
into a compact ("Compact") to establish comprehensive planning,
The
programming, and management of the Basin's resources.
Susquehanna River Basin Commission ("Commission") administered
the Compact. The Commission's powers included the authority to
review and approve projects affecting the Basin's resources.
In 1998, the Commission held hearings on the potential impact of
future withdrawals or diversions from the Susquehanna River by the

